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Abstract—Aggregators are playing an increasingly crucial role
in the integration of renewable generation in power systems.
However, the intermittent nature of renewable generation makes
market interactions of aggregators difficult to monitor and
regulate, raising concerns about potential market manipulation
by aggregators. In this paper, we study this issue by quantifying
the profit an aggregator can obtain through strategic curtailment
of generation in an electricity market. We show that, while the
problem of maximizing the benefit from curtailment is hard
in general, efficient algorithms exist when the topology of the
network is radial (acyclic). Further, we highlight that significant
increases in profit are possible via strategic curtailment in
practical settings.
Index Terms—Aggregators, renewables, optimal curtailment,
market power, locational marginal price (LMP).
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing the penetration of distributed, renewable energy
resources into the electricity grid is a crucial part of building
a sustainable energy landscape. To date, the entities that
have been most successful at promoting and facilitating the
adoption of renewable resources have been aggregators, e.g. as
SolarCity, Tesla, Enphase, Sunnova, SunPower, ChargePoint
[1]–[3]. These aggregators install and manage rooftop solar
installations as well as household energy storage devices
and electric vehicle charging systems. Some have fleets with
upwards of 800 MW distributed energy resources [4], [5], and
the market is expected to triple in size by 2020 [6], [7].
Aggregators play a variety of important roles in the con-
struction of a sustainable grid. First, and foremost, they are on
the front lines of the battle to promote installation of rooftop
solar and household energy storage, pushing for wide-spread
adoption of distributed energy resources by households and
businesses. Second, and just as importantly, they provide a
single interface point where utilities and Independent System
Operators (ISOs) can interact with a fleet of distributed energy
resources across the network in order to obtain a variety
of services, from renewable generation capacity to demand
response. This service is crucial for enabling system opera-
tors to manage the challenges that result from unpredictable,
intermittent renewable generation, e.g., wind and solar.
However, in addition to the benefits they provide, aggrega-
tors also create new challenges – both from the perspective of
the aggregator and the perspective of the system operator. On
the side of the aggregator, the management of a geographically
diverse fleet of distributed energy resources is a difficult
algorithmic challenge. On the side of the operator, the partic-
ipation of aggregators in electricity markets presents unique
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challenges in terms of monitoring and mitigating the potential
of exercising market power. In particular, unlike traditional
generation resources, the ISO cannot verify the availability
of the generation resources of aggregators. While the repair
schedule of a conventional generator can be made public, the
downtime of a solar generation plant and the times when solar
generation is not available cannot be scheduled or verified
after the fact. Thus, aggregators have the ability to strategically
curtail generation resources without the knowledge of the ISO,
and this potentially creates significant opportunities for them
to manipulate prices.
These issues are particularly salient given current proposals
for distribution systems. Distribution systems (which are typi-
cally radial networks) are heavily impacted by the introduction
of distributed energy resources. As a result, there are a variety
of current proposals to start distribution-level power markets
(see, for example [8] [9]), operated by Distribution System
Operators (DSOs). A future grid may even involve a hierarchy
of system operators dealing with progressively larger areas, net
load and net generation. In such a scenario, aggregators could
end up having a significant proportion of the market share,
and such markets may be particularly vulnerable to strategic
bidding practices of the aggregators. Thus, understanding the
potential for these aggregators to exercise market power is
of great importance, so that regulatory authorities can take
appropriate steps to mitigate it as needed.
A. Summary of Contributions
This paper addresses both the algorithmic challenge of
managing an aggregator and the economic challenge of mea-
suring the potential for an aggregator to manipulate prices.
Specifically, this work provides a new algorithmic framework
for managing the participation of an aggregator in electricity
markets, and uses this framework to evaluate the potential for
aggregators to exercise market power. To those ends, the paper
makes three main contributions.
First, we introduce a new model for studying the manage-
ment of an aggregator. Concretely, we introduce a model of
an aggregator in a two-stage market, where the first stage is
the ex-ante (or day-ahead) market that decides the generation
schedule based on the solution to a security-constrained eco-
nomic dispatch problem and the second stage is the ex-post
(or real-time) market to perform fine adjustment via Locational
Marginal Prices (LMPs) based on updated information.
Second, we provide a novel algorithm for managing the
participation of an aggregator in the two stage market. The
problem is NP-hard in general and is a bilevel quadratic
program, which are notoriously difficult in practice. However,
we develop an efficient algorithm that can be used by the
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2aggregators in radial networks to approximate the optimal
curtailment strategy and maximize their profit (Section IV).
Note that the algorithm is not just relevant for aggregators;
it can also be used by the operator to asses the potential
for strategic curtailment. The key insight in the algorithm
is that the optimization problem can be decomposed into
“local” pieces and be solved approximately using a dynamic
programming over the graph.
Third, we quantify opportunities for price manipulation (via
strategic curtailment) by aggregators in the two stage market
(Section III). Our results highlight that, in practical scenarios,
strategic curtailment can have a significant impact on prices,
and yield much higher profits for the aggregators. In particular,
the prices can be impacted up to a few tens of $/MWh in some
cases, and there is often more than 25% higher profit, even
with curtailments limited to 1%. Further, our results expose a
connection between the profit achievable via curtailment and
a new market power measure introduced in [10].
B. Related Work
This paper connects to, and builds on, work in four related
areas: (i) Quantifying and mitigating market power, (ii) Cyber-
attacks in the grid, (iii) Algorithms for managing distributed
energy resources, and (iv) Algorithms for bilevel programs.
Quantifying market power in electricity markets: There
is a large volume of literature that focuses on identifying
and measuring market power for generators in an electricity
market, see [11] for a recent survey.
Early works on market power analysis emerged from mi-
croeconomic theory suggest measures that ignore transmission
constraints. For example, [12] introduced the pivotal supplier
index (PSI), which is a binary value indicating whether the
capacity of a generator is larger than the supply surplus, [13]
later refined PSI by proposing residential supply index (RSI).
RSI is used by the California ISO to assure price competitive-
ness [14]. The electricity reliability council of Texas uses the
element competitiveness index (ECI) [15], which is based on
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) [16].
Market power measures considering transmission con-
straints have emerged more recently. Some examples include,
e.g., [17]–[21], and [22]. Interested readers can refer to [23],
which proposes a functional measure that unifies the structural
indices measuring market power on a transmission constrained
network in the previous work.
In contrast to the large literature discussed above, the
literature focused on market power of renewable generation
producers is limited. Existing works such as [10] and [24]
study market power of wind power producers ignoring trans-
mission constraints. The key differentiator of the work in this
paper is that the use of the Locational Marginal Price (LMP)
framework, which is standard practice in the electricity market
[25], [26], allows this work to offer insight about market power
of aggregators when transmission capacity is limited.
Cyber-attacks in the grid: The model and analysis in this
paper is also strongly connected to the cyber security research
community, which has studied how and when a malicious
party can manipulate the spot price in electricity markets by
compromising the state measurement of the power grid via
false data injection, e.g., see [27]–[31].
In particular, [29], [30] shows that if a malicious party can
corrupt sensor data, then it can create an arbitrage opportunity.
Further, [27] shows that such attacks can impact both the real
time spot price and future prices by causing line congestions.
In this paper, we do not allow aggregators to corrupt the
state measurements of the power system, rather we consider
a perfectly legal approach for price manipulation: strategic
curtailment. However, strategic curtailment in the ex-post
market can gain extra profit to the detriment of the power
system, which is a similar mechanism to those highlighted
in cyber attack literature. Technically, the work in this paper
makes significant algorithmic contributions to the cyber-attack
literature. In particular, the papers mentioned above focus on
algorithmic heuristics and do not provide formal guarantees.
In contrast, our work presents a polynomial time algorithm
that provably maximizes the profit of the aggregator.
Algorithms for managing distributed energy resources:
There has been much work studying optimal strategies for
managing demand response and distributed generation re-
sources to offer regulation services to the power grid. This
work covers a variety of contexts. For example, researchers
have studied frequency regulation [32] [33] and voltage reg-
ulation (or volt-VAR control) [34] [35]. A separate line of
work has been work on designing incentives to encourage
distributed resources to provide services to the power grid [36]
[37]. However, the current paper is distinct from all the work
above in that we study strategic behavior by an aggregator of
distributed resources. Prior work does not model the strategic
manipulation of prices by the aggregator.
Algorithms for bilevel programs: The optimization prob-
lem that the strategic aggregator solves is a bilevel program,
since the objective (aggregator’s profit) depends on the loca-
tional prices (LMPs). The LMPs are constrained to be equal to
optimal dual variables arising from economic dispatch-based
market clearing procedure. These types of problems have
been extensively studied in the literature, and fall under the
class of Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
(MPECs) [38]. Even if the optimization problems at the two
levels is linear, the problem is known to be NP-hard [39].
Global optimization algorithms [40] can be used to solve this
problems to arbitrary accuracy (compute a lower bound on the
objective within a specified tolerance of the global optimum).
However, these algorithms use a spatial branch and bound
strategy, and can take exponential time in general. In contrast,
solvers like PATH [41], while practically efficient for many
problems, are only guaranteed to find a local optimum. In this
paper, we show that for tree-structured networks (distribution
networks), an -approximation of the global optimum can
be computed in time linear in the size of the network and
polynomial in 1 .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we define the power system model that serves
as the basis for the paper and describe how we model the way
the Independent System Operator (ISO) computes the Loca-
tional Marginal Prices (LMPs). Locational marginal pricing is
3adopted by the majority of power markets in the Unites States
[26], and our model is meant to mimic the operation of two-
stage markets like ISO New England, PJM Interconnection,
and Midcontinent ISO, that use ex-post pricing strategy for
correcting the ex-ante prices [25], [26].
We consider a power system with n nodes (buses) and t
transmission lines. The generation and load at node i are
denoted by pi and di respectively, with p =
[
p1, . . . , pn
]T
and d =
[
d1, . . . , dn
]T
. We use [n] to denote the set of buses
{1, . . . , n}.
The focus of this paper is on the behavior of an aggregator,
which owns generation capacity, possibly at multiple nodes.
We assume that the aggregator has the ability to curtail
generation without penalty, e.g., by curtailing the amount of
wind/solar generation or by not calling on demand response
opportunities. Let Na ⊆ [n] be the nodes where the aggregator
has generation and denote its share of generation at node
i ∈ Na by pai (out of pi). The curtailment of generation at
this node is denoted by αi, where 0 ≤ αi ≤ pai . We define
our model for the decision making process of the aggregator
with respect to curtailment in Section III.
Together, the net generation delivered to the grid is repre-
sented by p−α, where αj = 0 ∀j 6∈ Na. The flow of lines is
denoted by f =
[
f1, . . . , ft
]T
, where fl represents the flow of
line l: f = G(p− α− d), where G ∈ Rt×n is the matrix of
generation shift factors [42]. We also define B ∈ Rn×t as the
link-to-node incidence matrix that transforms line flows back
to the net injections as p− α− d = Bf.
A. Real-Time Market Price
At the end of each dispatch interval, in real time, the ISO
obtains the current values of generation, demands and flows
from the state estimator. Based on this information, it solves
a constrained optimization problem for market clearing. The
objective of the optimization is to minimize the total cost of the
network, based on the current state of the system. The ex-post
LMPs are announced as a function of the optimal Lagrange
multipliers of this optimization. Mathematically, the following
program has to be solved.
minimize
f
cTBf (1a)
subject to
λ−, λ+ : ∆p ≤ Bf − p+ α+ d ≤ ∆p (1b)
µ−, µ+ : f ≤ f ≤ f (1c)
ν : f ∈ range(G) (1d)
In the above, ci is the offer price for the generator i. fl is
the desired flow of line l, and Bf = p+ ∆p− α− d, where
∆pi is the desired amount of change in the generation of
node i. Constraint (1b) enforces the upper and lower limits
on the change of generations, and constraint (1c) keeps the
flows within the line limits. In practice, the generation change
limits are often set to be constant values of ∆p
i
= −2
and ∆pi = 0.1, for all i, [43]. The last constraint ensures
that fl are valid flows, i.e. f = Gp˜ for some generation p˜.
Variables λ−, λ+ ∈ Rn+, µ−, µ+ ∈ Rt+ and ν ∈ Rt−rank(G)
denote the Lagrange multipliers (dual variables) corresponding
to constraints (1b), (1c) and (1d).
Note that the ISO does not physically redispatch the gener-
ations, and the optimal values of the above program are just
the desired values. In fact, by announcing the (ex-post) LMPs,
the ISO provides incentives for the generators to adjust their
generation according to the goals of the ISO [26].
Definition 1. The ex-post locational marginal price (LMP)
of node i at curtailment level of α, denoted by λi(α), is
λi(α) = ci + λ
+
i (α)− λ−i (α). (2)
We assume that there is a unique optimal primal-dual pair,
and therefore the LMPs are unique. In general, there are
several ways that ISOs ensure such condition, for instance
by adding a small quadratic term to the objective.
III. THE MARKET BEHAVIOR OF THE AGGREGATOR
The key feature of our model is the behavior of the
aggregator. As mentioned before, aggregators have generation
resources at multiple locations in the network and can often
curtail generation resources without the knowledge of the ISO.
Of course, such curtailment may not be in the best interest of
the aggregator, since it means offering less generation to the
market. But, if through curtailment, prices can be impacted,
then the aggregator may be able to receive higher prices for
the generation offered or make money through arbitrage of the
price differential.
In this section, we develop a model for a strategic aggrega-
tor, which we then use in order to understand in what situations
curtailment may be beneficial.
A. Preliminaries
To quantify the profit that the aggregator makes due to the
curtailment, let us take a look at the total revenue in different
production levels.
Definition 2. We define the curtailment profit (CP) as the
change in profit of the aggregator as a result of curtailment:
γ(α) =
∑
i∈Na
(λi(α) · (pai − αi)− λi(0) · pai ) (3)
Note that the curtailment profit can be positive or negative
in general. We say a curtailment level α > 0 is profitable if
γ(α) is strictly positive.
The curtailment profit is important for understanding when
it is beneficial for the aggregators to curtail. Note that we are
not concerned about the cost of generation here, as renewables
have zero marginal cost. However, if there is a cost for
generation, then that results in an additional profit during
curtailment, which makes strategic curtailment more likely.
B. A Profit-Maximizing Aggregator
A natural model for a strategic aggregator is one that
maximizes curtailment profit subject to LMPs and curtailment
constraints. Since LMPs are the solution to an optimization
problem themselves, the aggregator’s problem is a bilevel
4optimization problem. In order to be able to express this
optimization in an explicit form, let us first write the KKT
conditions of the program (1).
Primal feasibility:
∆p ≤ Bf − p+ α+ d ≤ ∆p (4a)
f ≤ f ≤ f (4b)
Hf = 0 (4c)
Dual feasibility:
λ−, λ+, µ−, µ+ ≥ 0 (4d)
Complementary slackness:
λ+i ((Bf)i − pi + αi + di −∆pi) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n (4e)
λ−i (∆pi − (Bf)i + pi − αi − di) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n (4f)
µ+l (fl − f l) = 0, l = 1, . . . , t (4g)
µ−l (f l − fl) = 0, l = 1, . . . , t (4h)
Stationarity:
BT (c+ λ+ − λ−) + µ+ − µ− +HT ν = 0 (4i)
Here H ∈ R(t−rank(G))×t, and the range of G is the nullspace
of H .
Using the KKT conditions derived above, the aggregator’s
problem can be formulated as follows.
γ∗ = maximize
α,f,λ−,λ+,µ−,µ+,ν
γ(α) (5a)
subject to
0 ≤ αi ≤ pai , i ∈ Na (5b)
αj = 0, j 6∈ Na (5c)
(4) (5d)
The objective (5a) is the curtailment profit defined in (3).
Constraints (5b) and (5c) indicate that the aggregator can
only curtails generation at its own nodes, and the amount of
curtailment cannot exceed the amount of available generation
to it. Constraint (5d), which is the KKT conditions, enforces
the locational marginal pricing adopted by the ISO. Note that if
one assumes that curtailments of a higher amount than a limit
τ can be detected by the ISO, then we can simply replace
pi(a) in (5b) by τi.
An important note about this problem is that we have as-
sumed the aggregator has complete knowledge of the network
topology (G), and state estimates (p and d). This is, perhaps,
optimistic; however one would hope that the market design
is such that aggregators do not have profitable manipulations
even with such knowledge. The results in this paper indicate
that this is not the case.
C. Connections between Curtailment Profit and Market Power
While our setup so far seems divorced from the notion of
market power, it turns out that there is a fundamental rela-
tionship between market power and the notion of curtailment
profit introduced above.
As mentioned earlier, there has been significant work on
market power in electricity markets, but work is only begin-
ning to emerge on the market power of renewable generation
producers. One important work from this literature is [10], and
the following is the proposed notion of market power from that
work.
Definition 3. For α∗i ≥ 0, the market power (ability) of the
aggregator is defined as
ηi =
(
λi(α
∗)− λi(0)
λi(0)
)
/
(
α∗i
pai
)
(6)
In this definition the value of ηi captures the ability of the
generator/aggregator to exercise market power. Intuitively, in a
market with high value of ηi, the aggregator can significantly
increase the price by curtailing a small amount of generation.
Interestingly, the optimal curtailment profit is closely related
to this notion of market power. We summarize the relationship
in the following proposition, which is proven in Appendix C.
Proposition 1. If the curtailment profit γ is positive then the
market power ηi > 1. Furthermore, the larger the curtailment
profit is, the higher is the market power.
This proposition highlights that the notion of market power
in [10] is consistent with an aggregator seeking to maximize
their curtailment profit, and higher curtailment profit corre-
sponds to more market power.
IV. OPTIMIZING CURTAILMENT PROFIT
The aggregator’s profit maximization problem is challenging
to analyze, as one would expect given its bilevel form. In fact,
bilevel linear programming is NP-hard to approximate up to
any constant multiplicative factor in general [44]. Furthermore,
the objective of the program (5) is quadratic (bilinear) in the
variables, rather than linear. This combination of difficulties
means that we cannot hope to provide a complete analytic
characterization of the behavior of a profit maximizing aggre-
gator.
In this section, we begin with the case of a single-bus ag-
gregator and build to the case of general multi-bus aggregators
in acyclic networks. For the single-bus aggregator, the optimal
curtailment can be found exactly, in polynomial time. For the
general case, we cannot provide an exact algorithm, but we
do provide a practical approximation algorithm for general
multi-bus aggregators in acyclic networks (e.g. distribution
networks).
A. An Exact Algorithm for a Single-Node Aggregator
Even in the simplest case, when the aggregator has only a
single node, i.e. its entire generation is located in a single
bus, it is not trivial how to solve the aggregator’s profit
maximization problem.
5Fig. 1. The LMP at bus i as a function of curtailed generation at that bus.
Shaded areas indicate the aggregator’s revenue at the normal condition and
at the aggreation.
The first step toward solving the problem is already difficult.
In particular, in order to understand the effect of curtailment
on the profit, we first need to understand how does curtailment
impact the prices – an impact which is not monotonic in gen-
eral. However, although LMPs are not monotonic in general,
it turns out that in single-bus curtailment, the LMP is indeed
monotonic with respect to the curtailment. The proof of the
following lemma is in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The LMP of any bus i is monotonically increasing
with respect to the curtailment at that bus. That is
λi(α
′) ≥ λi(α)
if α′i > αi, and α
′
j = αj for all j = [n]\{i}.
A consequence of the above lemma is that the price λi is a
monotonically increasing staircase function of αi, for any bus
i, as depicted in Fig. 1. Further, the binding constraints of (1)
do not change in the intervals, and thus the dual variables
remain the same, i.e., the LMPs remain constant. When a
constraint becomes binding/non-binding, the LMP jumps to
the next level.
In Fig. 1, the blue and red shaded areas are profit at the
normal condition and at the curtailment, respectively. The
difference between the two areas the curtailment profit. In
particular, if the red area is larger than the blue one, the
aggregator is able to earn a positive curtailment profit on bus
i. The optimal curtailment α∗i also happens where the red area
is maximized. It should be clear that the optimal curtailment
always happens at the verge of a price change, not in the
middle of a constant interval (otherwise it can be increased
by curtailing less).
Given the knowledge of the network and state estimates, it
is possible to find the jump points (i.e. where the binding con-
straints change) and evaluate them for profitability. Therefore,
if there are not too many jumps, an exhaustive search over the
jump points can yield the optimal curtailment. Based on this
observation, we have the following theorem, which is proven
in Appendix B.
Theorem 3. The exact optimal curtailment for an aggregator
with a single bus, in a network with t lines, can be found by
an algorithm with running time O(t3.373).
Clearly, this approach does not extend to large multi-bus
aggregators. The following sections use a different, more
sophisticated algorithmic approach for that setting.
B. An Approximation Algorithm for Multi-Bus Aggregators in
Radial Networks
In this section, we show that the aggregator profit max-
imization problem, while hard in general, can be solved in
an approximate sense to determine an approximately-feasible
approximately-optimal curtailment strategy in polynomial time
using an approach based on dynamic programming. In par-
ticular, we show that an -approximation of the optimal
curtailment profit can be obtained using an algorithm with
running time that is linear in the size of the network and
polynomial in 1 .
Before we state the main result of this section, we introduce
the notion of an approximate solution to (5) in the following
definition.
Definition 4. A solution (α, f, λ−, λ+, µ−, µ+, ν) to (5) is an
-accurate solution if the constraints are violated by at most
 and γ (α) ≥ γ∗ − .
Note that, if one is simply interested in approximating γ∗
(as a market regulator would be), the -constraint violation is
of no consequence, and an -accurate solution of (5) suffices
to compute an -approximation to γ∗.
Given the above notion of approximation, our main theorem
is the following (proof is in Appendix D):
Theorem 4. An -accurate solution to the optimal aggregator
curtailment problem (5) for an n-bus radial network can be
found by an algorithm with running time cn
(
1

)9
where c is
a constant that depends on the parameters pai , B, d, p, f , f .
On a linear (feeder line) network, the running time reduces to
cn
(
1

)6
.
We now give an informal description of the approximation
algorithm. Consider a radial distribution network with nodes
labeled i ∈ [n], (where 1 denotes the substation bus, where
the radial network connects to the transmission grid). Radial
distribution networks have a tree topology (they do not have
cycles). We denote bus 1 as the root of the tree, and buses
with only one neighbor as leaves. Every node (except the root)
has a unique parent, defined as the first node on the unique
path connecting it to the root node. The set of nodes k that
have a give node i as its parent are said to be its children. It
can be shown that the strategic curtailment problem on any
radial distribution network can be expressed as an equivalent
problem on a network where each node has maximum degree
3 (known as a binary tree, see Appendix D). Thus, we can
limit our attention to networks of this type, where every node
has a unique parent and at most 2 children.
For a node i, let c1 (i) , c2 (i) denote its children (where
c1 = ∅, c2 = ∅ is allowed since a node can have fewer than
two children). We use the shorthand
pnet (i) = fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − (pi − αi − di)
(4a) reduces to ∆p
i
≤ pnet (i) ≤ ∆pi where f1 = 0 and
f∅ = 0. The matrix H in (4c) is an empty matrix (the nullspace
of the matrix B is of dimension 0), so this constraint can be
6Fig. 2. The representation of a binary tree. For any node i, and its children
denoted c1(i), c2(i).
dropped. Using this additional structure, the problem (5) can
be rewritten (after some algebra) as:
maximize
λ,f,α
n∑
i=1
λi (p
a
i − αi) (7a)
subject to
0 ≤ αi ≤ pai , i ∈ [n] (7b)
∆p
i
≤ pnet (i) ≤ ∆pi, i ∈ [n] (7c)
f
i
≤ fi ≤ f i, i ∈ [n] \ {1} (7d)
λi

≤ ci, if pnet (i) = ∆pi
= ci, if ∆pi < p
net (i) < ∆pi
≥ ci, if pnet (i) = ∆pi
, i ∈ [n] (7e)
λcj(i) − λi

≥ 0, if fi = f i
= 0, if f
i
< fi < f i
≤ 0, if fi = f i
, i ∈ [n], j = 1, 2 (7f)
where λi is the LMP at bus i. Note that we assumed that
there is some aggregator generation and potential curtailment
at every bus (however this is not restrictive, since we can
simply set pai = 0 at buses where the aggregator owns no
assets).
Define xi = (λi, fi, αi). (7) is of the form:
max
x:hi(xi,xc1(i),xc2(i))≤0,i∈[n]
n∑
i=1
gi(xi) for some functions gi(.)
and hi(.). This form is amenable to dynamic programming,
since if we fix the value of xi, the optimization problem for
the subtree under i is decoupled from the rest of the network.
Set κn (x) = 0, define κi for i < n recursively as:
κi (x) = max xc1(i),xc2(i)
hi(x,xc1(i),xc2(i))≤0
∑2
j=1 gcj(i)
(
xcj(i)
)
+
κcj(i)
(
xcj(i)
)
Then, the optimal value can be computed as
γ∗ = maxx κ1 (x) + g1 (x) . However, the above recursion
requires an infinite-dimensional computation at every step,
since the value of κi needs to be calculated for every value of
x. To get around this, we note that the variables λi, fi, αi are
bounded, and hence xi can be discretized to lie in a certain
set Xi such that every feasible xi is at most δ(i) away (in
infinity-norm sense) from some point in Xi (Lemma 5). The
discretization error can be quantified, and this error bound can
be used to relax the constraint to hi (xi, xi+1) ≤  guarantee-
ing that any solution to (5) is feasible for the relaxed constraint.
This allows us to define a dynamic program (algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Dynamic programming on binary tree
S ← {i : c1 (i) = ∅, c2 (i) = ∅}
κi (x)← 0 ∀x ∈ Xi, i ∈ S
while |S| ≤ n do
S′ ← {i 6∈ S : c1 (i) , c2 (i) ∈ S}
∀i ∈ S′,∀x ∈ Xi:
κi (x)← max
x′1∈Xc1(i),x′2∈Xc2(i)
hi(x,x′1,x
′
2)≤
∑
j=1,2
gcj(i)
(
x′j
)
+ κcj(i) (x
′)
S ← S ∪ S′
end while
γ ← maxx∈X1 κ1 (x) + g1 (x)
The algorithm essentially starts at the leaves of the tree and
proceeds towards the root, at each stage updating κ for nodes
whose children have already been updated (stopping at root).
Along with the discretization error analysis in Appendix D,
this essentially concludes Theorem 4.
It is worth noting that previous work on distribution level
markets have used AC power flow models (at least in some
approximate form) due to the importance of voltage constraints
and reactive power in a distribution system [45]. Our approach
extends in a straightforward way to this setting as well, as
the dynamic programming structure remains preserved (the
KKT conditions will simply be replaced by the corresponding
conditions for the AC based market clearing mechanism).
V. THE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC CURTAILMENT
Using the algorithms developed in the previous sections,
we can now move to characterizing the potential impact
of strategic curtailment. We do this by first providing an
illustrative example of how curtailment leads to a larger profit
for a simple single-bus aggregator in a small, 6-bus network.
Then, we consider curtailment in larger networks and show the
global effect of strategic behavior. We use IEEE 14-, 30-, and
57-bus test cases, and their enhanced versions from NICTA
Energy System Test case Archive [46].
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LoadGenerator
is 20$/MWh, generation output range is 20 400 MW. In the given operating
condition, the actual load at bus 1 is 150MW and the actual generation output
is 375 MW. As a result, 100 MW power flows from bus 1 to 2, reaching the
line capacity 100 MW. A negative power flow value means the power flows
in the opposite direction of the defined line orientation, e.g. 96 MW power
flows from bus 3 to 2 in line l23, whose capacity is 100 MW.
code for the “add-then-remove” algorithm is Algorithm 1,
where the lines 2 to 5 correspond to adding loosening con-
straints while lines 6 to 14 for removing tightening constraints.
C. A case study and insights
To bring out intuitions, we implement the proposed algo-
rithm in an example 6 bus system in Fig. 1, where G 1 is
G =
0BBBBBBBB@
0.4  0.4  0.4 0.2 0.8 0
0.2 0.15 0.15  0.4  0.4 0
0.4 0.25 0.25 0.2  0.4 0
0.25 0.4  0.6 0.15 0.5 0
0.15 0.2 0.2 0.05 0.3 0
0.25 0.4 0.4 0.15 0.5 0
0.2 0.15 0.15 0.6  0.4 0
0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.2 0
1CCCCCCCCA
. (12)
In the given operating condition, the congestion pattern is
C+ = {l12, l14} and C  = {l56}. Suppose that bus 5 is the
tagged bus, where actual LMP5 > c5. The corresponding
At = {l14, l56} andAl = {l12}. By Algorithm 1, attackers add
l45 to Al, then remove l56 from At. In this case, the congestion
pattern of attack is Cat+ = {l12, l14} and Cat  = {l45}.
With closer observation, we see that the selected lines
are indeed those connect the tagged bus with its one-hop
neighboring buses. To reduce the LMP at the tagged bus,
attackers congest transmission lines of which the tagged bus
is the immediate sending end, i.e. l45, and decongest lines of
which the tagged bus is the immediate receiving end, i.e. l56.
In general, attackers may also need to congest or decongest
necessary lines between buses of multiple hops. The combined
actions fabricate a “radial” power flow pattern centered at the
tagged bus. This conveys a false message to the ISO that
excessive power is flowing out of the tagged bus, which is
the root cause of congestions. The ISO therefore reacts by
1The rows of G correspond to lines {l12, l14, l15, l23, l26, l36, l45, l56}
and columns correspond to bus 1 to 6.
“hypothetically”2 reducing the generation at the tagged bus 5
in the ex-post LMP problem, i.e., 4p⇤at5 < 4p⇤5. As a result,
LMP at the tagged bus is reduced as well.
IV. ATTACK IMPLEMENTATIONS
In this section, we realize the malicious congestion pattern
using LR attack, where different attacks are formulated de-
pending on the attackers’s control over measurements. Inter-
estingly, we also find that LR attack to real-time LMP also
has impact to future electricity market.
A. LR attack to real-time LMP
Suppose that a false data injection attack injects malicious
data a = (a1, a2, .., am)
0 into valid measurements z in (1).
Then, the received measurements are
z˜ = Hx+ e+ a. (13)
From (3), the ML estimate of x now becomes x˜ = xˆ + Pa
and the estimate of line flows is f˜ = fˆ + QPa. Compared
with the actual state estimate in (3), the introduced errors are
x˜  xˆ = Pa. Meanwhile, the residual is
r˜ = z˜ Hx˜ = (I HP)z˜ , B(z+ a). (14)
Load redistribution (LR) attack is first introduced in [8].
The attack vector of a LR attack is a = (ap;ad;af )
T , where
ap = 0 and eTad = 0 always hold to balance the power
generation and demand seen by the ISO. Notice that, LR
attacks do not compromise generation measurements. This is
because generation measurements are often physically well
protected and can be verified through direct communications
between ISOs and utility companies. In contrast, line flows
and load measurements are widely distributed and fast varying,
thus are more vulnerable to attacks.
1) LR attack without resource constraint: We first formu-
late LR attack to alter the real-time LMP assuming that the
attackers have full control over all load and line flow measure-
ments. We denote the set of positively-congested, negatively-
congested and un-congested lines derived from Algorithm 1
by Cat+ , Cat  and Catn , respectively. The attack objective is to
achieve the malicious congestion pattern with minimum errors
introduced to the state estimates, i.e. Pa. This is because large
deviations from predictions may raise suspicion of the ISO. In
addition, the BDD alarm must not be triggered.
Accordingly, LR attack is formulated as follows
minimize
a
||Pa||2 (15a)
s. t. (0, e,0)Ta = 0 (15b)
(I,0,0) · a = 0 (15c)
||B(a+ z)||2  ⌧ (15d)
✏ldˆ  Pd·(a+ z)  ✏udˆ (15e)
Ql,·Pa   fmaxl   fˆl, l 2 Cat+ (15f)
Ql,·Pa  fminl   fˆl, l 2 Cat  (15g)
fminl   fˆl +    Ql,·Pa  fmaxl   fˆl    , l 2 Catn
(15h)
2This is because ex-post calculation does not physically re-dispatch power
generation but only sets the real-time LMP based on current estimations.
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the curtailment.
250.00, 397.40 MW (See Fig. 3). The loads and the original
offer prices for the generators can be found in the figure. In
this case, the lines l12, l14 and l56 are carrying their maximum
flow, and the real-time LMPs are 20.0, 25.0, 25.0, 35.0, 28.7,
24.0 $/MWh, respectively.
Assume that the aggregator owns node 1 and aims to
increase its profit by curtailing the generation at this node.
It can be seen that by decreasing the generation at node
1 by 0.15, from 375.20 MW to 375.05 MW , the binding
and non-binding constraints in problem (1) change, and as
a result the ISO determines the new LMPs as 25.8, 25.0,
25.0, 35.0, 30.6, 24.0 $/MWh. Fig. 4 shows the LMPs,
before and after the curtailment. The curtailment profit is
γ = 25.8× 375.05− 20× 375.20 = 2172 $/h ,which means
that the aggregator has been able to increase its profit by 2172
$/h. For dispatch intervals of length 15 minutes, this amount
is around $543 per dispatch interval.
B. Case Studies
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Fig. 5. The difference from the optimal solution as a function of the running
time of the algorithm, on a 9-bus network with 1% curtailment allowance.
We simulate the behavior of aggregators with different
sizes, i.e. different number of buses, in a number of different
networks. We use the IEEE 14-, 30-, and 57-bus test cases.
Since studying market manipulation makes sense only when
there is congestion in the network, we scale the demand (or
equivalently the line flows) until there is some congestion in
the network. In order to examine the profit and market power
of aggregator as a function of its size, we assume that the way
aggregator grows is by sequentially adding random buses to
its set (more or less like the way e.g. a solar firm grows). Then
at any fixed set of buses, it can choose different curtailment
strategies to maximize its profit. In other words, for each of its
nodes it should decide whether to curtail or not (assuming that
the amount of curtailment has been fixed to a small portion).
We assume that the total generation of the aggregator in each
bus is 10 MW and it is able to curtail 1% of it (0.1 MW ).
For each of the three networks, Fig. 6 shows the profit for
a random sequence of nodes. Comparing the no-curtailment
profit with the strategic-curtailment profit, reveals an interest-
ing phenomenon. As the size of the aggregator (number of
its buses) grows, not only does the profit increase (which is
expected), but also the difference between the two curves in-
crease, which is the “curtailment profit.” More specifically, the
latter does not need to happen in theory. However in practice,
it is observed most of the time, and it points out that larger
aggregators have higher incentive to behave strategically, and
they can indeed gain more from curtailment.
Finally, to demonstrate the performance of our approxima-
tion algorithm on acyclic networks, we plot the suboptimality
gap versus running time of the algorithm (Fig. 5) on a radial
version of the IEEE 9-bus network (taken from [47] ). It can
be seen that with the optimal solution can be computed with
0 error in 10s.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Understanding the potential for market manipulation by
aggregators is crucial for electricity market efficiency in the
new era of renewable energy. In this paper, we characterized
the profit an aggregator can make by strategically curtailing
generation in the ex-post market as the outcome of a bi-
level optimization problem. This model captures the realistic
price clearing mechanism in the electricity market. With this
formulation when the aggregator is located in a single bus, we
have shown that the locational marginal price is monotonically
increasing with the curtailment; the profit directly correlates
with market power defined in the literature, and we have an
exact polynomial-time algorithm to solve the aggregators profit
maximization problem.
The aggregator’s strategic curtailment problem in a general
setting is a difficult bi-level optimization problem, which is
intractable. However, we show that for radial distribution
networks (where aggregators are likely located) there is an
efficient algorithm to approximate the solution up to arbitrary
precision. Finally, we show via simulations on realistic test
cases that, first, there is potentially large profit for aggregators
by manipulating the LMPs in the electricity market, and
second, our algorithm can efficiently find the (approximately)
optimal curtailment strategy.
We view this paper as a first step in understanding market
power of aggregators, and more generally, towards market
design for integrating renewable energy and demand response
from geographically distributed sources. With the result of
our paper, it is interesting to ask what can the operator do
to address this problem. In particular, how to design market
rules for aggregators to maximize the contribution of renew-
able energy yet mitigate the exercise of market power. Also,
extending the analysis to the case of multiple aggregators in
the market is another interesting direction for future research.
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9APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Let us take a look at the ISO’s optimization problem (1),
which is a linear program. It is not hard to see that the dual
of this problem is as follows.
maximize
λ−,λ+,µ−,µ+,ν
(∆p+ p− α− d)Tλ−+
(−p+ α+ d−∆p)Tλ+ + fTµ− − fTµ+ (8a)
subject to
BT (c+ λ+ − λ−)− µ− + µ+ +HT ν = 0 (8b)
λ−, λ+, µ−, µ+ ≥ 0 (8c)
If one focuses on the terms involving αi for a certain i, the
objective of the above optimization problem is in the form:
(∆p
i
+pi−αi−di)λ−i +(−pi+αi+di−∆pi)λ+i plus a linear
function of the rest of the variables (i.e. the rest of λ−, λ+, as
well as µ−, µ+, ν). There is no α in the constraints, and the
first two terms of this objective are the only parts where αi
appears (and with opposite signs).
We need to show that if αi is changed to αi + δ for some
δ > 0, then ci + λ+newi − λ−newi ≥ ci + λ+i − λ−i , where
λ+newi , λ
−new
i are the optimal solutions of the new problem.
We prove this in a general setting. Consider the following
two optimization problems.
f∗ = sup
x1,x2∈R
x3∈Rm
a1x1 + a2x2 + a
T
3 x3 (9a)
s.t. (x1, x2, x3) ∈ S (9b)
f∗new = sup
x1,x2∈R
x3∈Rm
(a1 − δ)x1 + (a2 + δ)x2 + aT3 x3 (10a)
s.t. (x1, x2, x3) ∈ S (10b)
Assume that the optimal values of the problems are attained
at (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3) and (x
∗new
1 , x
∗new
2 , x
∗new
3 ), respectively.
We claim that x∗new2 − x∗new1 ≥ x∗2 − x∗1 (This precisely
implies the LMP condition in our case, i.e. λ+newi −λ−newi ≥
λ+i − λ−i ).
Suppose by way of contradiction that x∗new2 − x∗new1 <
x∗2 − x∗1.
We know that a1x∗1 + a2x
∗
2 + a
T
3 x
∗
3 ≥ a1x1 + a2x2 +
aT3 x3, ∀(x1, x2, x3) ∈ S.
Therefore we have
(a1 − δ)x∗new1 + (a2 + δ)x∗new2 + aT3 x∗new3
= a1x
∗new
1 + a2x
∗new
2 + a
T
3 x
∗new
3 − δx∗new1 + δx∗new2
≤ a1x∗1 + a2x∗2 + aT3 x∗3 + δ(x∗new2 − x∗new1 )
< a1x
∗
1 + a2x
∗
2 + a
T
3 x
∗
3 + δ(x
∗
2 − x∗1)
= (a1 − δ)x∗1 + (a2 + δ)x∗2 + aT3 x∗3.
The first inequality above follows from the fact that
(x∗new1 , x
∗new
2 , x
∗new
3 ) ∈ S. Now the above implies that
(x∗new1 , x
∗new
2 , x
∗new
3 ) is not the optimal solution of (10), and
it is a contradiction.
As a result, x∗new2 − x∗new1 ≥ x∗2 − x∗1.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
Since we are in the single-bus curtailment regime, α has
only one nonzero component. For the sake of convenience,
we denote that element itself by a scalar α throughout this
proof (no α is vector in this proof). The proof consists of
the following two pieces: 1) From each jump point, the point
where the next jump happens can be computed in polynomial
time, 2) There are at most polynomially (in this case even
linearly) many jumps.
Assuming that the solution to the program (1) is unique, for
any fixed value of α, exactly t of the constraints (1b,1c,1d)
are binding (active). We can express these binding constraints
as
Af = b(α),
where A ∈ Rt×t is an invertible matrix, and b(α) ∈ Rt is a
vector that depends on α. As long as the binding constraints
do not change, the matrix A is fixed and the optimal solution
is linear in α (i.e. f = A−1b(α)). Then, for simplicity, we can
express the solution as f(α) = f0 + αa, for some t-vectors
f0 and a.
Now if we look at the non-binding (inactive) constraints of
(1), they can also be expressed as
A˜f < b˜,
for some matrix A˜ and vector b˜ of appropriate dimensions.
Inserting f into this set of inequalities yields A˜f0 +αA˜a < b˜,
or equivalently
α(A˜a)i < b˜i − (A˜f0)i,
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , (2n+ 2t− rank(G)).
Now we need to figure out that, with increasing α, which
of the non-binding constraints becomes binding first and with
exactly how much increase in α. If for some i we have
(A˜a)i ≤ 0, then it is clear that increasing α cannot make
constraint i binding. If (A˜a)i > 0 then the constraint can be
written as
α <
b˜i − (A˜f0)i
(A˜a)i
.
Computing the right-hand side for all i, and taking their
minimum, tells us exactly which constraint will become bind-
ing next and how much change in the current value of α results
in that.
The complexity of this procedure is O(t2.373) for computing
f0 and a, plus O(t(2n+ 2t)) = O(nt+ t2) for computing the
lowest bound among all the constraints. Hence the complexity
is O(t2.373).
The above procedure describes how the next jump point
can be computed efficiently from the current point. The exact
same procedure can be repeated for reaching the subsequent
jump points. All remains to show is the second piece of the
proof, which is that the number of jump points are bounded
polynomially. To show the last part note that by increasing
α, if a binding constraint becomes non-binding, it will not
become binding again. As a result, each constraint can change
at most twice, and therefore the number of jumps is at most
twice the number of constraints. Thus, the number of jumps
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is O(n + t), and the overall complexity of the algorithm is
O((n+ t)t2.373) = O(t3.373).
C. Proof of Proposition 1
From the definition of γ(α∗) = λi(α∗)(pai −α∗i )−λi(0)pai
it follows that
γ(α∗)
λi(0)(pai − α∗i )
=
λi(α
∗)
λi(0)
− p
a
i
pai − α∗i
= 1 +
λi(α
∗)− λi(0)
λi(0)
− (1− α
∗
i
pai
)−1
' 1 + λi(α
∗)− λi(0)
λi(0)
− (1 + α
∗
i
pai
)
=
λi(α
∗)− λi(0)
λi(0)
− α
∗
i
pai
. (11)
Therefore we have
pai
λi(0)(pai − α∗i )α∗i
γ(α∗) =
(
λi(α
∗)− λi(0)
λi(0)
)
/
(
α∗i
pai
)
− 1
= ηi − 1.
Since the left-hand side parameters are all positive, if γ(α∗) >
0, we can conclude that ηi > 1. Moreover, it is clear that the
larger the value of γ(α∗) is, the higher the value of ηi is. Note
that we used the approximation (1− α∗ipai )
−1 ' 1+ α∗ipai , since the
curtailment is small with respect to the generation; however,
the right-hand side expression (11) is an upper bound on the
left-hand side anyway, and the result holds exactly.
D. Proof of Theorem 4
Lemma 5 (δ-discretization). Given a set C ⊂ [L1, L1]×· · ·×
[Lk, Lk], there exists a finite set X such that
∀z ∈ C ∃z′ ∈ X , max
1≤i≤k
|zi − z′i| ≤ δ
and X contains at most V/δk points, where V = ∏ki=1(Li −
Li) is a constant (the volume of the box). X is said to be an
δ-discretization of C and written as X (δ).
Lemma 6 (Reduction to Binary Tree). Any tree with arbitrary
degrees can be reduced to a binary tree by introducing
additional dummy nodes to the network.
Proof. Take any node b in the tree with some parent a and
k > 2 children c1, . . . , ck. There exists m > 0 such that 2m <
k ≤ 2m+1 for some m. We will show that this subgraph can
be made a binary tree by introducing O(k) dummy nodes (in
m levels) between b and its children. The additional nodes and
edges are defined as follows:
b→ b0, b→ b1,
b0 → b00, b0 → b01, b1 → b10, b1 → b11,
b00 → b000, b00 → b001, . . . , b11 → b111,
up to m levels:
b0...00 → c1, b0...00 → c2, b0...01 → c3 . . .
This is transparently a binary tree with O(k) nodes. Each of
the new nodes has zero injection, and effectively the incoming
flow from its parent is just split in some way between its
children. This in fact enforces the flow conservation constraint
at b. Similar construction can be applied to any node of the
tree with more than two children, until no such node exists.
It can be seen that the number of nodes in the new graph is
still linear in n.
So any tree can be transformed to a binary one by the above
procedure. For the rest of the analysis we focus on the -
approximation of the dynamic program on the resulting binary
tree. The optimization problem (5) on a binary tree, can be
written after some algebra as the following.
max
λ,f,α
n∑
i=1
λi(pi − αi) (12a)
subject to
0 ≤ αi ≤ pai , i = 1, . . . , n (12b)
∆p
i
≤ fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di ≤ ∆pi,
i = 1, . . . , n (12c)
f
i
≤ fi ≤ f i, i = 2, . . . , n (12d){
(λi − ci)(fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di −∆pi) ≥ 0
(λi − ci)(fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di −∆pi) ≥ 0
,
i = 1, . . . , n (12e)
{
(λi − λcj(i))(f cj(i) − fcj(i)) ≥ 0
(λi − λcj(i))(f cj(i) − fcj(i)) ≥ 0
,
i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, 2 (12f)
The constraints 0 ≤ αi ≤ pai and f i ≤ fi ≤ f i, along with
a prior bound on lambda λ ≤ λ ≤ λ can be used to define the
box where xi = (λi, fi, αi) lives. Then an -accurate solution
is a solution to the following problem.
max
λ,f,α
n∑
i=1
λi(pi − αi) (13a)
subject to
∆p
i
−  ≤ fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di ≤ ∆pi + ,
i = 1, . . . , n (13b)
{
(λi − ci)(fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di −∆pi) ≥ −
(λi − ci)(fc1(i) + fc2(i) − fi − pi + αi + di −∆pi) ≥ −
,
i = 1, . . . , n (13c)
{
(λi − λcj(i))(f cj(i) − fcj(i)) ≥ −
(λi − λcj(i))(f cj(i) − fcj(i)) ≥ −
,
i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, 2 (13d)
Assuming a δ-discretization of the constraint set, each of the
constraints (as well as -accuracy of the objective) imposes
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a bound on the value of δ. For example constraint (13c)
requires 4δ ≤  (Note that we could have defined different
deltas δλ, δf , δα for different variables and in that case we
had 3δf + δp ≤ , but for simplicity we take all the deltas to
be the same). Similar bounds on δ can be obtained from the
other constraints, and taking the lowest upper-bound, implies
the existence of a constant c′ (that depends on the parameters)
such that δ ≤ /c′.
As a result we have a δ-discretization with |X | = V/δ3 =
c′3V/3 number of points, for any node. Therefore, the com-
putational complexity over any node will be |X |3, because
we have |X | many values for the node itself and |X | many
values for any of its two children. Since there are n nodes, the
overall complexity of the algorithm will simply be n|X |3 =
nc′9V 3/9 = cn/9.
